SCHOOL SPEECH IN THE INTERNET AGE: DO STUDENTS SHED
THEIR RIGHTS WHEN THEY PICK UP A MOUSE?
*

Michael J. O’Connor

In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the
Supreme Court definitively established that students do not “shed”
1
their right to free speech “at the schoolhouse gate.” However, the
Court also said that those rights must be “applied in light of the spe2
cial characteristics of the school environment . . . .” Ever since, there
has been debate over the exact boundaries of those rights.
There have been many changes in education since the Court decided Tinker, the birth of the Internet being one of the most revolutionary. The Internet provides immense opportunity for education
and enrichment, but it also exposes students to a vast array of dangerous and offensive content, some of which could have been created
by their classmates. Such a bridge between the school environment
and the outside world causes problems not envisioned in Tinker:
without using any school resources, students can create obscene, insulting, or disruptive content on their own time and expose all of
their classmates to it.
Though the Supreme Court has revisited and retailored the doctrine a number of times, only in its most recent school-speech case,
3
Morse v. Frederick, has it even obliquely addressed the issue of offcampus speech. The Court has never directly discussed the implications of electronic speech. Nevertheless, this Comment will suggest
that such speech can be regulated, even when it occurs outside of
school grounds, on the student’s own time, if it is substantially disruptive and directed primarily at a school audience.
Part I will discuss the Supreme Court’s precedent in the area,
which began with the Tinker “substantial disruption” test. Since then,
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cases have made it clear that the “substantial disruption” test is not
the only rubric under which schools can validly restrict student
speech. The Supreme Court has individually restricted both offen4
sively lewd speech in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser and prodrug speech in Morse. The Court’s explicit recognition in Morse that
“[w]hatever approach Fraser employed, it certainly did not conduct
5
the ‘substantial disruption’ analysis prescribed by Tinker” makes it
clear that these are two separate standards existing side-by-side. It
seems likely that in the future, courts will have to decide on a case-bycase basis whether to “add[] to the patchwork of exceptions to the
6
Tinker standard.” However, this Comment will consider whether
such ad-hoc exceptions are ever appropriate for regulating offcampus student speech and, if so, the type of exceptions that might
qualify. It will also attempt to consider whether this approach is inconsistent with First Amendment jurisprudence, or whether the apparent inconsistency is a result of looking at student speech in a vacuum.
Part II will discuss the issue of location. In Morse, the Supreme
Court summarily rejected the plaintiff’s argument that a student activity taking place across the street from the school during its normal
7
hours was not school speech. However, it acknowledged “some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when courts should apply
8
school-speech precedents.” This Part will look at off-campus speech
largely in isolation. While electronic speech is a more recent and arguably more dangerous phenomenon, schools and courts have been
dealing for years with the issues created by off-campus student newspapers and other vehicles for speech.
9
It is clear that the bar is lower for restricting student speech.
That dichotomy does not end at the schoolhouse gate. Students can
be held responsible for speech occurring outside the school setting.
This Comment will look at lower court precedent and outside commentary and attempt to determine what exactly “off-campus” means,
and what sway Tinker and its progeny hold in that realm.
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478 U.S. 675 (1986).
127 S. Ct. at 2627.
Id. at 2636 (Thomas, J., concurring).
See id. at 2624 (“Under these circumstances, we agree with the superintendent that Frederick cannot ‘stand in the midst of his fellow students, during school hours, at a schoolsanctioned activity and claim he is not at school.’” (citation omitted)).
Id. (citing Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004).
See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682 (“[T]he constitutional rights of students in public school are
not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”).
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Part III will discuss technology’s promises and pitfalls. The Internet is vital to modern education because it is an integral component
of research, business, and life in the modern world. Teachers cannot
and should not simply attempt to exclude it from their teaching.
Nevertheless, it is a dangerous place. Violence, pornography, hate
speech, and countless other evils are available online. The volume
and variety of this material is a scathing indictment of humanity’s
worst nature. However, the freedom of communication that the
Internet provides also makes possible some truly remarkable accomplishments, like Wikipedia’s army of volunteers attempting to make
10
available “free access to the sum of all human knowledge.”
This Comment will focus on the recent rise of social networking
11
sites. Facebook and MySpace now claim tens of millions of users,
sorted into schools and geographical areas and tied together by lists
of mutual friends, with even strangers often having access to some12
one’s personal information. In an environment like that, controversial and damaging statements can spread like wildfire, without even
the addressing required by e-mail. This Comment will consider
whether this unique environment gives school administrators more
freedom to discipline students and whether courts should give
greater deference to their decisions.
Part IV will discuss what schools can do about all this. What policies can they adopt, consistent both with their duty to protect and
educate their students and with the strictures of the First Amendment? There are numerous paths schools could take, from proactive
measures like using filtering software and including electronic offenses in disciplinary codes, to reactive measures like the standard detention, suspension, and expulsion. Many seem like veritable constitutional minefields.
Some lower courts have already applied Morse to electronic student speech, with mixed results. Commentators have suggested that
schools have a countervailing affirmative obligation to protect stu-
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Wikipedia Founder Jimmy Wales Responds (July 28, 2004, 13:00 EST), http://interviews.
slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/07/28/1351230 (interviewing Wikipedia’s founder about
the project’s history and its direction).
Spencer E. Ante et al., In Search of MyProfits: The Pressure Is on for Murdoch to Turn MySpace
into a Cash Machine, BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 5, 2007, at 23 (noting that in September 2007
Facebook had 30.6 million unique U.S. users while MySpace had 68.1 million).
See Simon Grose, Privacy Focus Caught in Web, CANBERRA TIMES, Nov. 5, 2007, at A15 (addressing the conflict between personal privacy and web 2.0 development: “You can set
your Facebook pages to limit who sees them, but many people don’t bother”).
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13

dents from harassment.
This Comment will review all of these
sources and consider when schools can validly restrict student speech
and what methods they can use to do it.
I. TINKER, BETHEL, AND MORSE: A TRIO OF TESTS
The First Amendment is phrased in clear and unambiguous
terms: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
14
speech . . . .” Its application has never been as clear as its text. The
Supreme Court has long recognized exceptions to freedom of
15
speech, even before its incorporation against the states. While we
value freedom of expression in this country, there is so little social
value inherent in libel, obscenity, or speech inciting violence that so16
ciety tolerates and even encourages its restriction.
The Court has also recognized that these restrictions can shift
with the identity of the speaker. Since the incorporation of the First
17
Amendment against the states, the Court has recognized that indi18
19
20
viduals like soldiers, prisoners, and students, by the nature of
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See Susan H. Kosse, Student Designed Home Web Pages: Does Title IX or the First Amendment
Apply?, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 905 (2001) (suggesting a tension between Title IX and the First
Amendment); Adam A. Milani, Harassing Speech in the Public Schools: The Validity of Schools’
Regulation of Fighting Words and the Consequences if They Do Not, 28 AKRON L. REV. 187
(1995) (suggesting a similar tension with Title VI and harassment on the basis of race).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding a conviction under the
Espionage Act of 1917 for circulating leaflets challenging the draft during World War I).
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There are certain . . . limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words . . . . It has been well observed that such utterances . . . are of such slight social value . . . that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”
(footnotes omitted)).
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“For present purposes we may and do
assume that freedom of speech and of the press—which are protected by the First
Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights
and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from
impairment by the States.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980) (“Thus, while members of the military services are entitled to the protections of the First Amendment, ‘the different character of
the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of
those protections.’ The rights of military men must yield somewhat ‘to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty . . . .’” (citations omitted)).
See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407–12 (1989) (explaining that while prisoners
do not lose their First Amendment rights, those rights must be weighed against penologi-
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their situation, cannot have the full gamut of rights normally accorded adults.
The watershed case in defining the free speech rights of students
was Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, in which
the Court concluded that “First Amendment rights, applied in light
of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available
to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students
or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
21
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”
In Tinker, three students, after meeting with their parents and
friends, decided to wear black armbands to protest the Vietnam
22
War. Learning of this protest in advance, the school adopted a policy of suspending any student who wore an armband and refused to
23
remove it. The students wore their armbands, were suspended, and
24
filed suit in response.
The district court dismissed their complaint, and the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was equally divided en banc, thereby af25
firming the opinion below. After granting certiorari, the Supreme
Court reversed, determining that schools could restrict student
speech if it “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial dis26
order or invasion of the rights of others.”
For seventeen years, the material disruption standard remained
the only law on the issue. It is admittedly flexible, allowing school officials the leeway to restrict student speech in a wide variety of different forms as long as they have a “well-founded expectation of disrup27
tion” arising from the speech’s content or its method of
28
distribution. Nevertheless, even when setting the standard in Tinker,

20
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cal needs and the difficulties of prison administration, and applying a reasonableness
standard instead of the Court’s normal strict scrutiny for speech restrictions).
See The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 157 (1969) (“The application of the
first amendment in the public schools is limited by the circumstance that a state may restrict a child’s free expression in situations where similar restrictions on adults would
clearly be unjustifiable.”).
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
Id. at 504.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 505.
Id. at 513.
Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 212 (3d Cir. 2001).
See Note, Prior Restraints in Public Schools, 82 YALE L.J. 1325, 1326–27 (1973) (explaining
that schools can regulate speech that is disruptive either because of its content or its method of distribution and differentiating between the restrictions that can be placed on
each).
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the Court expressed a concern with excessively interfering in the ad29
ministration of schools. This concern may have led to the development of exceptions to the Tinker rule beginning in Bethel School District
30
No. 403 v. Fraser.
In Fraser, the Court confronted the issue of whether a student
could be disciplined for making a nominating speech for class
elected office that described the nominee in sexually suggestive
31
32
terms. Matthew Fraser was smart enough to know that the way to
get high school students to sit up and pay attention in an assembly
where they otherwise would be napping was to “refer[] to his candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual meta33
phor.” Of course, school officials thought they knew the audience
as well. Their worry was that the girls and the younger students could
34
be insulted or confused by the speech’s content. Thus, they “suspended [him] for three days, and . . . removed [his name] from the
list of candidates for graduation speaker at the school’s commence35
ment exercises.”

29

30
31
32

33

34

35

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (“On the other hand, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the
need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in
the schools.”). The Court was likely motivated by such concerns in other areas where it
reviewed school actions, like corporal punishment in schools, which it addressed in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). See The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, supra note 20, at 122
(“[T]he Court was no doubt motivated by an implicit concern that the judiciary avoid excessive intervention into local educational policies . . . .”).
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
Id. at 677–78.
Smart enough to have been named top speaker in the state debate championships two
years in a row, which likely explains his flair for the dramatic. Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist.
No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985).
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677–78. What was so graphic? Fraser’s speech follows:
I know a man who is firm—he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character is firm—but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll
take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts—he drives
hard, pushing and pushing until finally—he succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end—even the climax, for each and every
one of you.
So vote for Jeff for A. S. B. vice-president—he'll never come between you and
the best our high school can be.
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 683 (“By glorifying male sexuality, and in its verbal content, the speech was acutely
insulting to teenage girl students . . . . [and] could well be seriously damaging to its less
mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old and on the threshold of awareness of human sexuality.” (citation omitted)).
Id. at 678.
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Who was right? Probably Matthew Fraser. It is doubtful many
students were offended. They later chose him to speak at graduation,
36
even though the school had taken him off the ballot. This lends
credence to Justice Stevens’s conclusion that Fraser “was probably in
a better position to determine whether an audience composed of 600
of his contemporaries would be offended by the use of a four-letter
word—or a sexual metaphor—than is a group of judges who are at
least two generations and 3,000 miles away from the scene of the
37
crime.” However, it is likely something entirely different was going
on, and both sides knew it. The Court was not protecting individual
students from insult or offense; it was protecting a particular notion
of what the school environment should be and to what messages the
38
students should be exposed.
The conclusion that Tinker and Fraser use two different standards
39
is now undeniable following Morse v. Frederick, but two questions remain: First, how do these standards interact? Second, does Morse
represent an extension of Fraser, or a new test entirely?
Fraser suggests at one point that its holding is derived from the fact
that “[u]nlike the sanctions imposed on the students wearing armbands in Tinker, the penalties imposed in this case were unrelated to
40
any political viewpoint.” This could be read as confining Tinker to
expressions of political speech, while Fraser deals with “vulgar speech
41
and lewd conduct” and Morse deals with pro-drug speech. However,
this does not make a lot of sense, as the Court has not provided an
exhaustive list of the types of speech that are “wholly inconsistent
36

37
38

39
40
41

Id. at 692 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 689 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“There is
no evidence in the record that any students, male or female, found the speech ‘insulting.’”).
Id. at 692 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. at 692 n.2 (“When a more orthodox message is being conveyed to a similar audience, four Members of today’s majority would treat high school students like college students rather than like children.” (citing Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S.
534 (1986) (dissenting opinions))). A number of commentators have criticized Bethel as
undermining the rule of Tinker. See Karrie M. Kalail, Recent Case, Matthew Fraser Sheds His
Constitutional Rights to Freedom of Speech at the Schoolhouse Gates, 20 AKRON L. REV. 563, 573
(1987) (“It does not seem necessary at this time to change something that has worked
well for the past twenty years. The courts and the schools have worked closely together to
preserve order and a proper educational environment.”); Sara Slaff, Note, Silencing Student Speech: Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 203, 223 (1987)
(“Without clear evidence of disruption, students’ free expression rights in school must
not be abridged.”).
127 S. Ct. 2618, 2627 (2007) (“Whatever approach Fraser employed, it certainly did not
conduct the ‘substantial disruption’ analysis prescribed by Tinker . . . .”).
478 U.S. at 685.
Id.
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with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school education.” Thus,
under this reading, a school could not restrict even speech causing a
substantial disruption unless it was political, lewd, or promoted drug
use. Such an interpretation is simply untenable.
Another reading of Fraser might conclude that it does not forbid
any specific topic, but simply makes clear that certain methods of
43
conveying those messages are not constitutionally protected. This
content versus method distinction is difficult to apply when one considers that the “method” the school and the Court found objectionable was part of the content of Fraser’s speech.
All these approaches continue a mistake that has long been made
with regards to school speech: that it is somehow different from regular First Amendment jurisprudence. Tinker and Fraser could also be
described as a specific factual microcosm of the free speech rules for
adults, including their exceptions for obscenity, fighting words, etc.
Just as the Constitution generally prohibits restrictions on speech, it
recognizes certain exceptions to that rule: libel, fighting words, defamation, false or misleading commercial speech, and child pornog44
raphy.
Fraser represents the enunciation of this rule for the school con45
text. As Justice Brennan makes clear, Fraser’s speech would have
46
been protected had it been given by an adult outside of school. The
response to this criticism is that there is a vast difference between the
two situations, and thus a corresponding difference between the rules
applied to them. Students may have the right to say things of social
value, but they do not have the right to use any method or form to

42
43
44

45

46

Id. at 685–86.
See id. at 683 (“Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain
modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions.”).
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (child pornography); Cent. Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–66 (1980) (commercial speech);
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23, 24 (1973) (obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (fighting words); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 269 (1964) (libel); see also Slaff, supra note 38, at 208 n.33 (listing these categories
and the related cases).
Unsurprisingly, lower courts have already held that the narrower exemptions, like fighting words, that apply to all free speech continue to be applicable in the school context.
Even when the words are uttered off-campus, school administrators can punish students’
use of language falling within these exemptions. See, e.g., Fenton v. Stear, 423 F. Supp.
767 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (holding that a student’s suspension after an incident in a shopping
center was permissible under the fighting words doctrine).
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“If respondent had given the same
speech outside of the school environment, he could not have been penalized simply because government officials considered his language to be inappropriate . . . .”).
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47

disseminate that message. The Court has recognized that obscene
speech is unprotected, and Fraser can be viewed as an extension of
48
that doctrine, owing to the unique nature of the school.
If Fraser is simply an extension of existing free speech jurisprudence, where does that leave Morse? It would seem to be an opinion
that stands alone, declaring that pro-drug speech is so harmful that
“the governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse—reflected
in the policies of Congress and myriad school boards, including
JDHS—allow schools to restrict student expression that they reasona49
bly regard as promoting illegal drug use.” This is important, because when the Court permits the government to circumscribe
speech for all, it generally does so on the basis that “such utterances
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
50
morality.” Fraser is an extension of this concept for obscenity, declaring that speech that was borderline before, now measured against
the potential susceptibility of children to its influence, is no longer
shielded by the Constitution.
With that in mind, Morse can seem in some places to be a natural
outgrowth of existing jurisprudence and in some places something
entirely new. It is familiar because it is banning not speech that is
harmful in itself, but speech that could result in harm—the use of
51
drugs by students. In that sense, it is like Tinker, articulating a standard that allows the suspension of speech that could reasonably lead
to a harmful result.

47

48

49
50
51

See id. at 682 (majority opinion) (“[T]he First Amendment gives a high school student the
classroom right to wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s jacket.” (quoting Thomas v.
Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979))). Cohen’s jacket refers to a jacket bearing the words “Fuck the Draft” worn by Paul Cohen in the Los Angeles County Courthouse, for which he was arrested for disturbing the peace. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971). The Supreme Court reversed the conviction because, among other reasons,
“the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us.” Id. at 25.
See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 635 (1968) (“Obscenity is not within the area of
protected speech or press.”). But cf. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(“Moreover, despite the Court’s characterizations, the language respondent used is far
removed from the very narrow class of ‘obscene’ speech which the Court has held is not
protected by the First Amendment.”).
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2007).
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628 (“Drug abuse can cause severe and permanent damage to the
health and well-being of young people . . . .”).
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Justice Stevens insists otherwise and relies on the fighting words
doctrine to come to the conclusion that Morse’s sign cannot be pro52
hibited. In relying on the fighting words doctrine as it applies to
adults, though, he seems to be ignoring part of the Court’s point:
that the vulnerability of a particular group to a particular type of
harm can be taken into account in determining whether that harm is
sufficient. The difference is in what harmful results are adequate to
53
support suppression for each particular audience.
There is one aspect of Morse that makes it difficult to integrate
with the rest of First Amendment jurisprudence. Most restrictions on
speech are content-based, but Morse restricts speech on the basis of
viewpoint, banning only pro-drug speech, not anti-drug speech. Jus54
tice Stevens also criticizes this aspect of the Court’s opinion.
Though the majority attacks him for immediately undermining his
own argument by admitting that “it might well be appropriate to tol55
erate some targeted viewpoint discrimination in this unique setting,”
56
it also seeks to refocus the argument onto the effects of the speech.
While a full discussion of the differences between content and viewpoint discrimination is beyond the scope of this Comment, it is worth
noting that this approach would stand in stark contrast to a case like
57
R.A.V. v. St. Paul. In that case, the Court was bound to accept a lower court determination that the scope of a state hate speech statute
restricted only speech recognized as fighting words, but it still struck

52

53

54
55
56
57

See id. at 2646 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“No one seriously maintains that drug advocacy
(much less Frederick’s ridiculous sign) comes within the vanishingly small category of
speech that can be prohibited because of its feared consequences. Such advocacy, to borrow from Justice Holmes, ‘ha[s] no chance of starting a present conflagration.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting))).
Another aspect that should eventually be examined is the likelihood of the harmful result
being obtained from the speech in question. It does not appear from decisions in the
lower courts that this has been thoroughly examined, with most inquiries focusing on the
potential magnitude of the resultant harm. For example, if a student is “disrespectful” to
a teacher, there is little question that it will encourage some of his classmates to be disrespectful, but how many classmates is it likely to encourage, and will that constitute a material disruption? See generally Shlomit Wallerstein, Criminalising Remote Harm and the Case
of Anti-Democratic Activity, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2697 (2007) (providing an informative
breakdown of the issues surrounding criminalization of actions that incite others to violence or create a climate that might encourage others to violence).
Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2644–46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2646; see id. at 2629 (majority opinion) (criticizing Justice Stevens’s viewpoint).
See id. at 2628 (majority opinion) (discussing the serious problem of drug abuse by children).
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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down the law because it facially discriminated on the basis of view58
point.
Before I examine the landscape created by Tinker, Fraser, and
59
Morse, I will consider the Dartagnan to these Three Musketeers : Ha60
zelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. While the other three cases speak
of a general standard of behavior, Hazelwood seems to stand only for
the proposition that educators can control speech that “one would
61
reasonably believe . . . bore the school’s imprimatur.” The Court in
Hazelwood concluded that “the standard articulated in Tinker for determining when a school may punish student expression need not also be the standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend
62
its name and resources to the dissemination of student expression.”
Hazelwood has led to plenty of debate and discussion, but I believe
it simply illustrates the idea that the school speech arena is not isolated from developments in wider First Amendment jurisprudence.
In the past several decades, there has been substantial evolution of
the government speech doctrine, which recognizes that government
63
has a legitimate right to speak and to take sides on issues when do64
ing so. Hazelwood recognizes that schools are government actors and
therefore entitled to control speech that could be reasonably viewed
65
as originating with them.
So, what points the way forward in the world after Morse? Will we
keep seeing isolated issues ascend to the High Court one after the

58

59
60
61

62
63
64

65

Id. at 381 (“Assuming, arguendo, that all of the expression reached by the ordinance is
proscribable under the ‘fighting words’ doctrine, we nonetheless conclude that the ordinance is facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on
the basis of the subjects the speech addresses.”).
See ALEXANDRE DUMAS, THE THREE MUSKETEERS (New York, Crowell 1894).
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2627. But see Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood’s Core: A
New Approach to Restrictions on School-Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 75 (2008) (“The
courts that have concluded that Hazelwood is inapplicable . . . have done so on the
grounds that textbook and curricular decisions reflect pure government speech . . . . In
contrast, the courts that have applied Hazelwood seem to have interpreted Hazelwood as
implicitly announcing a generally applicable ‘reasonableness’ standard for all school district decisions about speech-related matters.”).
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272–73.
See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005) (“[S]ome government programs involve, or entirely consist of, advocating a position.”).
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (upholding a government program funding
health care services, but forbidding doctors from mentioning abortion to patients whose
care is subsidized by the program).
See Edward L. Carter et al., Applying Hazelwood to College Speech: Forum Doctrine and Government Speech in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 157, 177–81 (2006) (linking
Hazelwood with government speech doctrine more generally).
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other, “adding to the patchwork of exceptions to the Tinker stan66
dard” ? In Morse, pro-drug speech is entirely permissible for adults,
but the potential harm to children is considered so profound that it
must be banned. Though drug use by children is unquestionably
harmful, so are a myriad of other issues: teen pregnancy, school violence, low graduation rates, and poor instruction. It is unclear what
separates pro-drug speech from the rest.
Justice Thomas suggests the Court’s “jurisprudence now says that
students have a right to speak in schools except when they don’t—a
standard continuously developed through litigation against local
67
schools and their administrators.” He is probably not far from the
truth, but that truth is not unusual in constitutional litigation. The
rules in school speech are evolving as different cases test, in light of
different facts, the free speech interests of students against the duty
of governments to protect and educate them. This is the manner of
68
First Amendment jurisprudence generally. Morse may be the beginning of recognition that school speech jurisprudence is not a walled
garden with its own special standards and rules, completely isolated
from outside legal developments.
We may soon see the integration of the school speech line of cases
69
with the standard tiers of scrutiny. Morse suggests just this result
when the Court notes that “deterring drug use by schoolchildren is
70
an ‘important—indeed, perhaps compelling’ interest.” For anyone
versed in constitutional litigation, these words are heavy with mean-

66
67
68

69

70

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 2634.
This does not, however, mitigate Justice Thomas’s point that this is “a standard continuously developed through litigation against local schools and their administrators,” id., and
his implicit criticism of such a system that distracts teachers from their primary duty to
educate.
This follows a trend of merging a number of independent First Amendment analyses under the umbrella of intermediate scrutiny. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 784–
85 (“First Amendment intermediate scrutiny thus first emerged as a product of the merger of several distinct and relatively narrow branches of the Court’s jurisprudence.”); see
also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 52 (1987) (lumping a number of different tests under the rubric of “[i]ntermediate review”). This assumes, of course, that the tiered approach itself does not come tumbling down. See Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945
(2004).
Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661
(1995)).
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ing. They indicate a balancing of governmental rights against indi71
vidual rights, and suggest a type of intermediate scrutiny.
However, it is far from certain that the Court will fold school
speech jurisprudence into intermediate scrutiny. Justices Alito and
Kennedy, for example, may conclude that such an approach would
72
be a further extension to which they could not adhere. Even if intermediate scrutiny is adopted, it says nothing of what the Court will
hold to be an important interest, especially if it determines the standard to be an important interest “in light of the special characteristics
73
of the school environment.”
School speech rules after Morse are not entirely clear, but some
conclusions can be drawn. Speech likely to cause a material disruption can be restricted under Tinker. Lewd speech can be restricted
under Fraser. Pro-drug speech can be restricted under Morse. The
only issue is that, while Fraser could have been viewed as an extension
of broader First Amendment doctrine on obscene speech, the same
cannot be said of Morse. So it remains to be seen if the Court will
continue to approve ad hoc exceptions, attempt to create an overarching standard as I have suggested, or overhaul the system entirely,
74
as Justice Thomas has recommended.

71

72

73
74

Strict scrutiny is the traditional approach for content-based restrictions challenged under
the Free Speech Clause. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991) (testing New York’s Son of Sam Law for a compelling
interest and narrow tailoring). However, intermediate scrutiny is used in a wide variety of
content-neutral regulations on speech. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 791 (1989) (time, place, and manner restrictions); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (“The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech.”); United States v. O’Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968) (applying intermediate scrutiny to symbolic conduct).
See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating in his opinion, which Justice
Kennedy joined: “I join the opinion of the Court with the understanding that the opinion does not endorse any further extension”). Of course, the concurrence also states that
both Justices “join the opinion of the Court on the understanding that the opinion does
not hold that the special characteristics of the public schools necessarily justify any other
speech restrictions.” Id. at 2637 (emphasis added). This does not preclude further permissible restriction, so long as the case in question presents a more compelling regulatory
interest than pro-drug speech, residing as it does at the “far reaches of what the First
Amendment permits.” Id. at 2638.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I think the better approach is to dispense with Tinker altogether, and given the opportunity, I would do so.”).
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II. EXAMINING OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH
As difficult as the behavioral boundaries of school speech can
sometimes be to navigate, its physical boundaries are even more uncertain. There is a simple reason for that: despite discussing student
First Amendment rights in at least five significant cases (Tinker, Fraser,
75
Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico,
Hazelwood, and Morse), the Supreme Court has thus far only obliquely
examined the extent to which the student speech doctrine extends
beyond the physical boundaries of the school. Cut adrift without Supreme Court guidance, the lower courts and numerous commentators have attempted to divine the extent to which the school speech
doctrine reaches off-campus conduct, but it is not clear if they have
had any success. While I suspect the Court will eventually have to
confront this issue head-on and I may therefore be adding my voice
to a storm soon to be quelled, I will nevertheless make the attempt
because it is an important component of an examination of school
speech in the Internet age.
The Supreme Court’s only examination (if one can call it that) of
the off-campus speech issue came recently in Morse, where it recognized “some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when courts
76
should apply school-speech precedents, but not on these facts.” Its
determination was based on the fact that Morse’s actions were directed towards the school and visible by its students. They took place
across the street, during regular school hours, at an event sanctioned
77
by the school and supervised by its staff. The Court concluded that
“Frederick cannot stand in the midst of his fellow students, during

75

76
77

457 U.S. 853 (1982). This case is not always cited as a major school speech case because it
did not actually deal with the right of students to speak, but dealt instead with their right
to receive information. In Pico, the Court was faced with the question of whether a school
board could have books removed from the school library because it disagreed with their
content. Id. at 856–57, 873. The Court held that it could not. Id. at 875. However, Justice Brennan’s opinion spoke for only a plurality of the Court and may no longer be good
law in the wake of United States v. American Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003), in which the
Court approved Congress’s requirement of filtering software as a condition of funding
provided to libraries. See Richard J. Peltz, Pieces of Pico: Saving Intellectual Freedom in the
Public School Library, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 103, 147 (“ALA thus left Pico on uncertain
terms. Is the omission of a reference to Pico an acknowledgement of the apparent distinction between selection and removal? Or does the Rehnquist plurality mean to imply
that Pico has no vitality as precedent?”).
127 S. Ct. at 2624 (citing Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 n.22 (5th
Cir. 2004)).
Id.
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school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and claim he is not at
78
school.”
In acknowledging the uncertainty in the lower courts, the Chief
Justice cited Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board, which addressed
the issue of holding Adam Porter responsible for a drawing he had
made at the age of fourteen depicting his school under siege and his
79
principal being attacked. The sketch was on a pad that was stored
away in the closet and only emerged two years later when his younger
80
brother decided to draw a llama and take it to school. Another student spotted the earlier drawing and showed it to the bus driver, who
confiscated the pad and informed the school, which led to the sus81
pension of both Adam and his younger brother.
In Porter, the Fifth Circuit held that Adam’s drawing was “not ex82
actly speech on campus or even speech directed at the campus.”
The court recognized that its precedent had previously held students
responsible for off-campus speech, as had the Seventh Circuit and a
83
number of district courts. Nevertheless, the court concluded that
“the fact that Adam’s drawing was composed off-campus and remained off-campus for two years until it was unintentionally taken to
school by his younger brother takes the present case outside the
84
scope of these precedents.”
So we have rough boundaries: Morse at one end and Porter at the
other. Only a few circuits have examined the space between. Before
I consider their opinions, it will be helpful to frame the issues. The
first is which, if any, of the standards applies off-campus. Is it Tinker
85
alone, or Fraser, as well? The second issue is what culpability the
speaker had in the speech reaching the school. There are three basic
possibilities: the speaker could actually have directed the speech at
the school, he could have realized it was likely the speech would
reach the school, or he could simply have realized it was possible that
the speech would reach the school.

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
393 F.3d at 611.
Id.
Id. at 611–12.
Id. at 615.
Id. at 615 n.22.
Id. at 616 n.22.
At the time of this Comment’s publication, no court of appeals has yet examined whether
Morse applies to conduct that is more clearly off-campus than the situation presented in
the case itself.
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In Boucher v. School Board of the School District of Greenfield, the Seventh Circuit reversed a preliminary injunction blocking the expulsion
of a student who had written an underground student newspaper on
86
how to hack the school’s computers. Though the articles were writ87
ten off-campus, the paper was distributed on campus. The Seventh
Circuit noted that “the district court found that the article advocates
88
on-campus activity.” Thus, it had no problem concluding that the
89
paper was subject to Tinker and its progeny. Though this is cited by
other courts as an off-campus speech case, because the paper was actually distributed on school grounds, it should probably not be
viewed as one.
In Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District, the Fifth Circuit
permitted the suspension of a student for the distribution of a paper
90
just outside the school grounds as students entered. The school had
a policy requiring prior submission of papers to be distributed, and
91
following a warning by the principal, Paul Kitchen was suspended.
In the ensuing disciplinary proceedings, Paul insulted the school and
the principal, using (amongst other things) “‘the common Anglo92
Saxon vulgarism for sexual intercourse.’”
The Fifth Circuit did not address the fact that the speech was offcampus, and it even conceded that “his actions did not materially and
93
substantially disrupt school activities.” Nevertheless, the court upheld the suspension because of Paul’s “flagrant disregard of estab94
lished school regulations.” Given when and where Paul distributed
the papers, it can at least be said that it was likely the papers would
make their way onto campus, and it would be reasonable to say that
Paul directed them at campus. Thus, the Fifth Circuit has apparently

86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

94

134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1998).
See id. at 828–29.
Id. at 829.
Id.
475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 1074.
Id.
Id. at 1076. Given the insubordination that Paul Kitchen had shown to school officials, it
is a little surprising that the Fifth Circuit did not simply conclude that insubordination itself constituted a disruption or at least relied on the “expectation of disruption” standard.
Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 212 (3d Cir. 2001). Of course, given how
soon this was decided after Tinker, it is possible that this standard had simply not yet developed.
Sullivan, 475 F.2d at 1077 (“Today we merely recognize the right of school authorities to
punish students for the flagrant disregard of established school regulations; we ask only
that the student seeking equitable relief from allegedly unconstitutional actions by school
officials come into court with clean hands.”).
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held that off-campus speech directed at campus can be punished
95
even when it does not cause a material disruption.
The Second Circuit addressed the issue of off-campus speech in
96
Thomas v. Board of Education. There, in a case involving the primarily
off-campus publication of an irreverent satirical magazine, the court
noted that though it could “envision a case in which a group of students incites substantial disruption within the school from some remote locale,” it did not have to address the issue because “there was
simply no threat or forecast of material and substantial disruption
97
within the school.” However, the Second Circuit also set an apparently strong presumption against punishing off-campus speech, explaining that:
When school officials are authorized only to punish speech on school
property, the student is free to speak his mind when the school day ends.
In this manner, the community is not deprived of the salutary effects of
expression, and educational authorities are free to establish an academic
environment in which the teaching and learning process can proceed
free of disruption. Indeed, our willingness to grant school officials substantial autonomy within their academic domain rests in part on the confinement of that power within the metes and bounds of the school it98
self.

In Killion v. Franklin Regional School District, the District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania reviewed the punishment of a
student for a derogatory top ten list that insulted the school’s athletic
99
director. Canvassing a number of cases and jurisdictions, it concluded that “[t]he overwhelming weight of authority has analyzed
student speech (whether on or off campus) in accordance with Tinker. Further, because the Bozzuto list was brought on campus, albeit
100
by an unknown person, Tinker applies.”
That reasoning seemingly conflicts with the guiding principles
laid down by the Second Circuit in Thomas. If students are subject to
punishment because of their off-campus speech simply because an
unknown individual brings it onto campus without their knowledge
or consent, then they are not really free to speak their mind. In Killion, the student, Zachariah Paul, had already been warned (after a

95

96
97
98
99
100

The continuing vitality of this holding is questionable. As previously noted, under more
modern doctrine, the Fifth Circuit would have been able to use the “expectation of disruption” standard as well as a fuller understanding of Tinker itself.
607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979).
Id. at 1052 n.17.
Id. at 1052.
136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
Id. at 455.
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previous list) that he would be punished if he brought another list to
101
school.
He therefore created the list at home, e-mailed it to
102
friends, and did not attempt to bring it to school. Had he known
that he would be punished for these actions, perhaps he would not
103
have spoken at all.
The Killion court does come to the conclusion though that Fraser
would be an inapplicable precedent to use in the case of off-campus
104
speech. It cites Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Fraser as well as
the principles set forth in Thomas and other cases in coming to the
conclusion that while Tinker may reasonably be applied to the out-of105
school context, Fraser may not.
To summarize, the status of off-campus speech in the wake of
Morse is as unclear as the question of what speech can be restricted.
Nevertheless, courts have generally agreed that speech originating
off-campus that is purposely directed on-campus and causes or could
reasonably be foreseen to cause a material disruption can be restricted.
III. THE PARTICULAR DANGERS OF THE INTERNET
By now, parents, teachers, and anyone else responsible for the
care and safety of children should be aware of the potential dangers
of the Internet. The ease of communication and relative anonymity
that it affords can have a corrosive effect on the judgment and man106
ners of even responsible adults. Moreover, the dangerous content
101
102
103

104

105

106

Id. at 448.
Id.
The court in Killion ultimately held that “Paul’s suspension violates the First Amendment
because defendants failed to satisfy Tinker’s substantial disruption test.” Id. at 455. However, this does not remove the implication that, under the Court’s reasoning, Tinker could
potentially apply anywhere in the world at any time if the individual is a student and their
speech somehow finds its way onto campus. This seems in tension with the principles of
Thomas and in clear contradiction of the holding in Porter.
Id. at 456 (“‘[I]f respondent had given the same speech outside the school environment,
he could not have been penalized simply because government officials considered his
language to be inappropriate. . . .’” (second alteration in original) (citing Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring))).
Id. at 458 (“Given the out of school creation of the list, absent evidence that Paul was responsible for bringing the list on school grounds, and absent disruption . . . we
hold . . . that defendants could not, without violating the First Amendment, suspend Paul
for the mere creation of the Bozzuto Top Ten list.”).
See, e.g., The Editors of Fortune, The 101 Dumbest Moments in Business, 2007, FORTUNE,
Dec. 24, 2007, at 147 (“‘I like Mackey’s haircut. I think he looks cute.’—Whole Foods CEO
John Mackey, posting under the screen name Rahodeb, on a Yahoo Finance stock forum. The Federal Trade Commission reveals that Mackey authored this and numerous other posts over
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of the Internet can have an especially negative influence on impres107
sionable young minds. It exposes students to predators, “stalking,
bullying, raunchy photos and videos, too much time spent on social
108
networking sites, academic fraud,” and even increased temptation
109
to commit suicide.
At the same time, the Internet can be a powerful educational tool
and a celebration of the best of human nature. Near-instantaneous
communication shrinks the world in which we live. Online news websites enable us to read articles from the New York Times, the Sydney He110
rald, and the Jerusalem Post all at the same time.
Online entertain111
ment lets us watch the television show, American Gladiators, at our
112
own convenience. From the encouraging to the disheartening, the
enriching to the corrupting, the Internet puts it at our fingertips.
Most importantly for schools, though, it is now an essential part of life
and business for many adults, and therefore an essential part of edu113
cation for students the world over.
Focusing specifically on the ability to restrict student speech narrows the issues. Teachers and the courts are generally worried about
the ability of students at home to project disruption onto school

107

108
109

110

111
112
113

an eight-year period, hyping his company and himself while trashing the competitor he
hoped to acquire, Wild Oats.”). See generally Penny Arcade!—Green Blackboards (And
Other Anomalies), http://www.penny-arcade.com/comic/2004/03/19 (last visited Jan.
15, 2009) (expounding a theory of the effect on a normal person of the anonymity and
audience the Internet provides).
See, e.g., Dena Potter, Victim Battles Child Sex ‘Monsters,’ DAILY PRESS (Newport News, Va.),
Jan. 24, 2008 (discussing the efforts of Alicia Kozakiewicz, a Pennsylvania teenager abducted in 2002 after meeting a man online, to expand police efforts to fight online predators).
Alan Sepinwall, What Your Kids Are up to Online, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Jan. 22,
2008, at 29.
See David Pilditch, Dangers That Lurk on Friends’ Websites, EXPRESS (U.K.), Jan. 24, 2008, at
17 (“Anne Parry, of the suicide prevention charity Papyrus, said: ‘We’ve been running a
campaign for the last three years to try to draw attention to the dangers of the internet.’ . . . In a study earlier this month, the charity found a growing number of young people were committing suicide after reading about it on the internet.”).
See New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com (last visited Jan. 15, 2009); Jerusalem Post,
http://www.jpost.com (last visited Jan. 15, 2009); Sydney Morning Herald, available at
http://www.smh.com.au (last visited Jan. 15, 2009).
American Gladiators (NBC television broadcasts 2008).
American Gladiators: Video, http://www.nbc.com/American_Gladiators/video/index.
shtml#mea=282944 (last visited Jan. 15, 2009).
See, e.g., Matt Walcoff, Kenyan Teacher Outlines Internet Needs, RECORD (Kitchener-Waterloo,
Ontario), Nov. 19, 2007, at B3 (“Computer literacy is an essential part of education that
can help young Africans escape the cycle of poverty and benefit from the global economy, said Kaye Jackson of Cobourg, co-founder of the Canada/Kenya-Rarieda Development Programme, or CANRAD.”).
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grounds, causing harm from a distance unimagined in Tinker. Social
networking sites are a particular danger. Two social networking sites
currently dominate the landscape: Facebook, with approximately
30.6 million unique users every month, and MySpace, with approxi114
mately 68.1 million.
Both have had their problems. MySpace has come under fire for
115
its use by child predators.
In response, “it detected and deleted
116
Face29,000 convicted sex offenders on its service” in July 2007.
book has been criticized for things like its Beacon service, which
“tracked purchases Facebook members made on other Web sites and
117
sent alerts to their Facebook friends about the transactions.”
The problem with sites like MySpace and Facebook is that they
tend to magnify issues already present on the Internet. Users can
post things that are “part diary, part photo album, with gossip, favorite music, pet peeves—sometimes even phone numbers and home
118
All of these are
addresses. And occasionally, revealing pictures.”
available at other sites. The difference with social networking sites is
threefold: (1) these functions are gathered together in one place;
(2) the sites have massive user bases and daily traffic; and (3) your
friends have quick and convenient access to everything you post.
Facebook’s personal privacy settings allow you to adjust precisely
119
who can see what you post, but by default, information can be seen
120
by any of your friends and anyone in your networks. Since networks
include both major cities and major universities, when you post a picture you later regret, it is probably not comforting that it was “only”
available to the Philadelphia major metropolitan area or every Penn
State student and alum. Also, though Facebook does some filtering

114
115

116

117
118
119

120

Ante, supra note 11.
See Pete Williams, MySpace, Facebook Attract Online Predators, MSNBC.COM, Feb. 3, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11165576/ (discussing the use of MySpace by teenagers
and the assaults of children occurring after meeting individuals on the site).
MySpace Deletes 29,000 Sex Offenders, REUTERS, July 24, 2007, available at http://
www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSN2424879820070724?feedType=RSS&rpc=
22&sp=true.
Facebook Adds Privacy Features, USA TODAY, Mar. 18, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.
com/tech/products/2008-03-18-179825145_x.htm.
Williams, supra note 115.
Help Center: Privacy, How can I protect my privacy?, http://www.facebook.com/help.
php?page=419 (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (“You can customize your privacy settings from
the Privacy page. From here you have total control over who can view all of your content.”).
Help Center: Privacy, How Can I Control Who Can See My Profile?, http://www.
facebook.com/help.php?page=419 (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (“By default, only users
within your networks and your confirmed friends can view your profile.”).

Jan. 2009]

SCHOOL SPEECH IN THE INTERNET AGE

479

121

when you claim an affiliation with a college or high school net122
work, it will not perform any filtering when you join a regional net123
work. So that guy who says he is from “West Philadelphia born and
124
raised” may actually be from the South Side of Chicago or Corpus
Christi, Texas. There is simply no way to know.
As problematic as this is, the real issue in the school speech context is school network affiliation. As I noted, under Facebook’s default privacy settings, anyone attending a school would have access to
student posts. Even under restricted settings, their friends (which
125
likely include many of their classmates) would have access.
Very
quickly, a message written in the heat of the moment, an embarrassing picture, or an unflattering description of a faculty member can
become the talk of the school.
The rapid distribution of painful insults can magnify an existing
problem. Billy Wolfe knows this well. He is a sophomore at a high
school in Fayetteville, Arkansas, and bullies have been picking on him
126
since he was twelve.
Facebook only made things worse. In ninth
grade, some boys started a Facebook group named “Every One That
127
Hates Billy Wolfe.”
121

122

123

124

125

126

127

Help Center: Networks, What Do I Need in Order to Join a Supported Facebook Network?, http://www.facebook.com/help.php?page=403 (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (“To
join a college network, you need to have a valid school email account.”).
Id. (“If you have a school email address or an invitation from another member of your
high school network, you will be able to affiliate during registration. Alternatively, . . . you will need to be approved by a member of your high school network in order to join it.”).
Id. (“Just enter your city, and we’ll show you the regional networks closest to you.”). Facebook does, however, restrict how frequently you can change your regional network. See
I Can’t Add a Network., http://www.facebook.com/help.php?page=403 (last visited Jan.
15, 2009) (“Facebook limits all users to a single regional network. This region can only
be changed twice every sixty days from the ‘Networks’ tab of the Account page. These
limits are in place to protect the privacy of our users’ accounts.”).
See DJ JAZZY JEFF & THE FRESH PRINCE, The Fresh Prince of Bel Air, on DJ JAZZY JEFF & THE
FRESH PRINCE: THE GREATEST HITS (Zomba Productions Ltd. 1988); see also Fresh Prince
of Bel Air Theme Song Lyrics, http://www.jazzyjefffreshprince.com/lyrics/will-smith/bsides/will-smith-fresh-prince-of-bel-air-theme.htm (last visited on Jan. 15, 2009).
People should carefully consider who they leave on their friends list. Photos posted by
two Penn State students that showed them dressed up in Halloween costumes mocking
the Virginia Tech shootings were restricted so that only friends could view them, but they
were still discovered and distributed by “a Virginia Tech senior and ‘high school enemy’”
of one of the pair. Lauren Boyer, Students Defend Costume Choice, DAILY COLLEGIAN, Dec.
10, 2007, available at http://www.collegian.psu.edu/archive/2007/12/10/students_
defend_costume_choice.aspx.
Dan Barry, A Boy the Bullies Love to Beat Up, Repeatedly, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2008, at A1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/24/us/24land.html?ex=1364097600&en=
a959e88983771fc2&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss.
Id.
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Facebook “feeds” only amplify these problems. Whenever you
change your profile, update your status, post a picture, or write a
message on a friend’s wall, your actions get listed on your friends’
128
homepages. They do not have access to information they could not
129
already have gotten by checking your profile, your pictures, etc., but
it does “make[] it easier for people to get that information pushed to
130
Suddenly, not only is there a group whose purpose is to
them.”
mock a student by calling him a “bitch” and a “homosexual that NO
131
ONE LIKES,” but everyone knows about it immediately.
The initial introduction of the feature caused outrage among Facebook users, who formed online protest groups joined by thousands
132
133
One user described it as “kind of stalker-ish.”
The
of people.
Washington Post viewed it as an example of Facebook’s “immense
134
popularity backfir[ing],” exposing more users to more information
more quickly, and fanning the flames of outrage harder and faster
than would have occurred otherwise. Facebook has since “introduced privacy settings that give users more control over what infor135
mation gets broadcast to members of their social network” but it
136
did not abandon the feature.
In order to illustrate the effect of these features, let’s consider an
example from a case I discussed earlier. One can take the insulting
137
top-ten list from Killion and imagine that instead of simply e-mailing

128

129

130
131
132

133
134
135
136
137

See Bambi Francisco, Facebook’s Growing Pains, MARKETWATCH, Sept. 14, 2006,
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/Story.aspx?guid=f84d887b-6e05-4c47-a30df2895ccdf0cb&siteid=mktw&dist=morenews (“Facebook’s News Feed—for those unclear
about what it is—works just like alerts or headlines on RSS readers or pages. The only
difference is that news on Facebook’s feeds isn’t about the latest problems at H-P, or
Google’s quarterly results, but rather whether someone is single or not.”).
Id. (“Facebook’s news feeds never broadcast information to people who would not have
already had access to that personal information.”); see also Help Center: News Feed, What
Privacy Settings Are Used for News Feed?, http://www.facebook.com/help.php?page=408
(last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (“You will only see stories about actions that you have permission to see, as determined by the privacy settings of the person who made the action.”).
See Francisco, supra note 128.
Barry, supra note 126.
Susan Kinzie & Yuki Noguchi, In Online Social Club, Sharing Is the Point Until It Goes Too Far,
WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2006, at A1 (“Within hours, online protest groups were formed and
thousands of people had joined.”).
Id.
Id.
Laura Schreier, After Uproar, Facebook Boosts Privacy: Complaints Prompt Networking Site to
Upgrade Its Upgrade, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 9, 2006, at 10A.
Id.
See supra note 99 and accompanying text.

Jan. 2009]

481

SCHOOL SPEECH IN THE INTERNET AGE
138

the list to friends, he posted it on a classmate’s Facebook wall.
If
both Zachariah Paul (the plaintiff in Killion) and his friend leave
their privacy settings on the default, then essentially the entire school
will instantly have access to the fact that the athletic director “is con139
stantly tripping over his own chins.”
Moreover, anyone logging in
to the site will see that Paul posted something and can click a simple
link to go to it. In many cases, the text of the post may appear in the
feed. It is the twenty-first century equivalent of taking out a giant
roadside ad right in front of the school.
In this Section, I have examined the problems that the Internet
and social networking sites present in the school speech context.
They combine instantaneous communication with the ability to distribute information (sometimes unintentionally) to a large group of
people. If they are accessed on campus, then they are no different
than an underground newspaper like the one in Sullivan v. Houston
140
Independent School District.
IV. WHAT SCHOOLS CAN DO
This Comment has examined the evolution of school speech law
to this point, both in what can be regulated and when it can be regulated. It has also looked at the unique issues raised by student speech
being conducted on the Internet and particularly on social networking sites. It is time to consider all of these elements. The final question in this examination of school speech in the Internet age is:
“What can schools do about all this?”
They could choose to eliminate Internet access in schools entirely,
but as we have seen, it is now becoming such a vital part of life and
business that technological literacy may be almost as important as
math or science. Schools could also choose to employ filtering soft141
ware. Even these responses may be ineffective, though. The social

138

139
140
141

The wall is a particular area on an individual’s profile page where friends can write messages, post links, etc. See Help Center: Wall, http://www.facebook.com/help.php?page
=443 (last visited Jan. 15, 2009).
Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448 n.1 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973); see supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003) (upholding a condition
Congress put on library funding that mandated the use of filtering software by the libraries receiving the funds); see also supra note 75 (discussing a previous case, Pico, 457 U.S.
853 (1982), and its questionable validity in light of the decision in American Library Ass’n).
Regardless of the applicable law, these solutions are easily circumvented. See Peacefire:
To Get Around Your Blocking Software, http://www.peacefire.org (last visited Jan. 15,
2009) (listing various ways of disabling or getting around blocking software).
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links and software features on sites like Facebook still permit students
to rapidly share potentially disruptive information. Postings that insult or undermine teachers and administrators, cause fights between
students, or can otherwise cause a significant disruption in the school
are still being spread rapidly among students even if none of them
access it in the building.
Some judges have already addressed these issues. In Wisniewski v.
Board of Education of Weedsport Central School District, the Second Circuit
addressed off-campus electronic speech head-on, concluding that Aaron Wisniewski could be punished for having an Instant Messenger
icon depicting a person being shot in the head with the words “Kill
142
Mr. VanderMolen” below it. The court concluded that “[t]he fact
that Aaron’s creation and transmission of the IM icon occurred away
from school property does not necessarily insulate him from school
143
discipline.” However, the panel was divided on the rationale, so it is
144
unclear how useful Wisniewski is for laying a framework. Nevertheless, finding that the school’s punishment was permissible under the
145
Tinker standard, the court upheld Aaron’s suspension.
In Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District, the District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri reviewed the suspension of Brandon
Beussink for creating a vulgar webpage “critical of the administration
146
at Woodland High School.” He had created it at home, on his own
147
computer, outside of school hours. After a dispute, a student who
viewed the page at Beussink’s house showed it to the computer
148
teacher at their high school. Beussink was suspended, and application of the high school’s policy on unexcused absences (which includes days on suspension) resulted in him “failing all of the classes

142
143
144

145

146
147
148

494 F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2007). Mr. VanderMolen was the plaintiff’s English teacher at
the time. Id.
Id. at 39.
Id. (“In this case, the panel is divided as to whether it must be shown that it was reasonably foreseeable that Aaron’s IM icon would reach the school property or whether the undisputed fact that it did reach the school pretermits any inquiry as to this aspect of reasonable foreseeability.”).
Id. at 38–39 (“Even if Aaron’s transmission of an icon depicting and calling for the killing
of his teacher could be viewed as an expression of opinion within the meaning of Tinker,
we conclude that it crosses the boundary of protected speech and constitutes student
conduct that poses a reasonably foreseeable risk that . . . it would materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
Id.
Id. at 1178.
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in which he was enrolled for the second semester of his junior
149
year.”
The court concluded that Beussink’s suspension was improper because his actions “did not materially and substantially interfere with
150
school discipline.” However, perhaps the most notable part of the
opinion is that it sidesteps the off-campus issue entirely. Granted, the
page did not rise to the Tinker standard of disruption, but given the
151
“crude and vulgar language” employed, one would think the court
would at least mention Fraser. Of course, this may reflect the reasoning of Killion that Fraser’s standard is inapplicable to off-campus
152
speech.
The court in Doninger v. Niehoff did not find such an argument
153
persuasive.
The case dealt with a student’s punishment for a post
on her LiveJournal that referred to school administrators as “dou154
chebags.” LiveJournal is a site which, like Facebook and MySpace,
permits users to list their friends and thereby easily access each oth155
For this reason, it implicates many of the same coner’s entries.
cerns discussed with regards to social networking sites. The court, relying on Wisniewski, “believe[d] that Avery’s blog entry may be
considered on-campus speech for the purposes of the First Amend156
ment.” It relied especially on the foreseeability of the speech being
157
viewed by other students and school administrators.
In short, the courts seem to be split. There is general support,
both under off-campus speech precedents and under these electronic
speech cases, for regulating off-campus electronic speech under the
Tinker standard. Whether schools will also be able to regulate off-

149
150
151
152

153
154
155
156
157

Id. at 1180.
Id. at 1181.
Id. at 1177.
See Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 457 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (“Although we agree that several passages from the list are lewd, abusive, and derogatory, we
cannot ignore the fact that the relevant speech, like that in Klein and Thomas, occurred
within the confines of Paul’s home, far removed from any school premises or facilities.”).
514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007).
Id. at 206.
See FAQ Question #61, http://www.livejournal.com/support/faqbrowse.bml?faqid=61&
view=full (last visited Jan. 15, 2009).
Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 217.
Id. (“Most importantly, the content of the blog was related to school issues, and it was reasonably foreseeable that other LMHS students would view the blog and that school administrators would become aware of it.”).
The Second Circuit affirmed this decision in Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir.
2008).
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campus electronic speech under Fraser is a much more tenuous question.
V. CONCLUSION
Since Tinker was decided, school speech has been a contentious issue. Students want the right to express themselves freely. Administrators want the right to enforce school rules and to create an atmosphere conducive to learning. The courts are trying to balance these
competing interests and to maintain the integrity of the First
Amendment while advancing the state’s compelling interest in educating its children.
This was difficult enough before the Internet and social networking sites made statements that were once confined to underground
newspapers or graffiti on the wall of the bathroom stall available to all
and widely publicized. It seems clear that schools can regulate any
speech, electronic or not, on-campus or not, that is likely to cause a
material disruption. Whether they may go beyond that and apply the
Supreme Court’s more recent standards from Fraser and Morse is yet
to be decided.
The courts should be willing to apply both Fraser and Morse, but in
sharply circumscribed situations, namely where students have specifically targeted the school with their speech. Otherwise, the Internet
would make it possible to skirt Tinker-and-Fraser-era restrictions simply
because there is now a back door into the school that did not then
exist. Direct targeting of the school by students is insubordinate. It
should be considered an attempt to undermine teacher authority and
rightly punished on that basis. However, such a policy will require
careful monitoring by the courts to ensure that schools are not punishing students simply for targeting other students, absent some substantial disruption that spills over into the school setting. Schools
should not be policing student social relationships.
Beyond intentionally targeted speech, there is great value in the
Second Circuit’s determination that the student should be “free to
158
speak his mind when the school day ends” and that “our willingness
to grant school officials substantial autonomy within their academic
domain rests in part on the confinement of that power within the
159
metes and bounds of the school itself.”
Education is vital and
school discipline is essential to providing an effective education.
158
159

Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 (2d Cir. 1979).
Id.
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Nevertheless, the free expression of students and their free interaction with their peers is also important, and it should not be curtailed
simply because of the development of new technology.

